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by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, February 26, 1988
[The following consists of a translation of the Nicaraguan contras' formal proposal presented to
representatives of the Nicaraguan government at the first face-to-face cease-fire talks in San Jose,
Costa Rica. The proposal was presented on January 28, 1988, and distributed by the German wire
service, DPA.] 1. The Nicaraguan Resistance believes that a basic premise of the Esquipulas accords
is the simultaneous implementation of a cease-fire and democratization. This notion is expressed
in the conceptualization and spirit of Esquipulas II, and reiterated as vital to immediate compliance
[by accord signatories] in the "joint declaration" signed by the Central American presidents on
January 16, 1988. 2. The Nicaraguan Resistance believes it essential that during the scheduled
negotiations on the 28th and 29th of this month in San Jose, Costa Rica, the belligerent parties reach
agreement on the places, dates, duration, continuity and agenda points of these meetings. The
negotiations must be realized through commissions, whose official delegates must be Nicaraguan,
and accredited by the mediator [Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo]. The [two] parties will freely
name respective consultants and define their participation in the process. 3. The Nicaraguan
Resistance supports the fundamental principle that a cease-fire is part of an integral politico-military
negotiation process that, in accordance with the Esquipulas II accord, must be simultaneous. Such
simultaneity demands tripartite negotiations among the government of the Sandinista Front,
the civilian domestic opposition and the Nicaraguan Resistance. 4. The Nicaraguan Resistance
proposes: 4.1. That the new lethal aid to be approved by the US Congress be placed in reserve for
a period of 30 days. 4.2. That during this period, the Sandinista government reach an agreement
with the domestic opposition and the Nicaraguan Resistance on the following: A. A calendar of
deadlines [must be defined] to implement the demands of the domestic opposition. Included here
are the 17 reforms to the Constitution of the Sandinista regime demanded by the 14 opposition
political parties and organizations participating in the national dialogue, and which encompass the
totality of the Nicaraguan political spectrum. "...To eliminate the causes and pretexts of violence
and war, as well as foreign intervention in all forms, it is necessary to construct an authentically
democratic, viable and trustworthy order, which guarantees effective political participation of all
sectors of the population in the nation's [political] life. Consequently, a constitutional reform is
required that eliminates...provisions which impede genuine democratization, and includes others
that promote the opening of a genuine democratic process, such as those contained in our 17-point
proposal..." [The 17 points are:] 1. Prohibition of presidential reelection. 2. Prohibition of family
members' succession to the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the Republic. 3. Prohibition of active
service military personnel from voting and running for political office. 4. Reform of [government
council] charged with regulating and organizing elections. 5. Independence of the judiciary system,
and its exclusive jurisdictional exercise. 6. Clarification of property rights. 7. Delimitation of the
powers of the Presidency of the Republic. 8. Reform of the nature of the Nicaraguan Armed Forces.
9. Reestablishment of university autonomy. 10. Reestablishment of municipal autonomy. 11.
Establishment of conscientious objector status as exemption from military service. 12. Establishment
of prohibition against all manner of legal sanctions of a proscriptive character. 13. Dissolution of
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confusion among the Sandinista Popular Army-FSLN Party-State. 14. Precise definition of the
concept of immunity. 15. Creation of a Human Rights Attorney General office (Procuraduria de
Derechos Humanos). 16. Creation of a Constitutional Guarantee Tribunal. 17. Replacement of the
"preamble" of the Sandinista Constitution. B. That the modalities of the cease-fire, its duration,
and specific determination of geographic zones and measures must fully guarantee the integrity,
security, mobility, communications, and logistics, of the belligerent parties, ensuring their defensive
capabilities. [During the cease-fire], that neither party can quantitatively or qualitatively improve
or expand its positions and armaments. Thus, all forced recruitment is to be suspended, the law
creating the Sandinista popular militias will be abolished, and the peasant cooperatives are to
be demobilized, and all youths and citizens under military organization will be reintegrated into
civilian life. Both parties will take measures for the humanization of the war with full respect for
human rights, including the suspension of indiscriminate bombings and the use of mines. 4.3.
The cease-fire will enter into effect at the latest at the conclusion of the 30-day period indicated
in 4.1., simultaneously with the implementation of the democratic reforms specified in 4.2.A. 4.4.
During the cease-fire period: A. The Sandinista regime and the Nicaraguan Resistance will establish
mechanisms for: a gradual disarmament of both parties; the demobilization and reintegration into
civilian life of persons in both armed forces who wish to do so; the immediate repatriation of foreign
military advisers; the establishment of a single National Army [from members of both forces], of a
voluntary and apolitical character, while also creating the military equivalents of security forces and
national police within the context of a restructured and purged armed forces. [In this restructuring
process,] the National Army would be reduced to a level compatible with the country's economic
capacity, security needs, and the necessary equilibrium with the armed forces of Central America. B.
The Central American governments will negotiate with the Sandinista government on security and
armaments limitation agreements referred to in Esquipulas II. 4.5. At the conclusion of the ceasefire period, the accords described in 4.4. would enter into effect. 4.6. In the event of failure to comply
with the cease-fire agreement, the democratization agreements, or denunciations regarding the
violation of essential rights or liberties of citizenship, [the 30-day hold on release of military aid to be
approved by the US Congress as ] established in 4.1. would cease to be effective. 5. The Nicaraguan
Resistance reiterates that a total and unconditional amnesty decree must be [implemented by the
Sandinista government], to achieve the objective of an authentic national reconciliation and the
effective reincorporation in the socio-economic and political life [of the country] under conditions
of full liberty and security for all Nicaraguans. 6. Despite the passage of treaty deadlines, the
Nicaraguan Resistance once again reaffirms its hopes in the Esquipulas II accords, and its trust in
the historical responsibility of the presidents of Central America.
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